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Introduction 
1. To celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Report on Competition Policy, this edition 
begins with an overview of the major developments of competition policy and 
enforcement over the past 40 years. The Treaty provisions laying down the 
Commission's powers and responsibilities in the field of competition policies have 
remained remarkably stable over the past 40 years, while the economic and political 
environment have dramatically changed. Competition policy rules and procedures 
have thus undergone a constant process of adaptation in order to contribute to the 
major objectives of the EU: building the Single Market, making it deliver for 
consumers and achieving a competitive social market economy. Looking back at this 
evolution provides the basis for assessing the key challenges competition policy has 
faced in the past and those that remain to be tackled.  
2. The first section of this report provides an overview of how the instruments of 
competition policy, namely the State aid, antitrust and merger control rules, were 
further developed and applied. This section also includes an update on the use of the 
temporary rules for State aid adopted as a response to the financial and economic 
crisis. The second section discusses how competition instruments were deployed in 
selected sectors. The third section focuses on cooperation within the European 
Competition Network (ECN) and with national Courts while section four deals with 
international activities. Section five provides an overview of consumer-related 
activities and dialogue with stakeholders. Last, a brief description of inter-
institutional cooperation is given in section six. Unlike last year's report, the present 
report does not contain a focus chapter on a topic considered of particular importance 
in the field of competition policy. 
3. This report is a non-exhaustive summary of activities undertaken by the Commission 
in the field of competition policy over the year 2010. Further information can be 
found in a detailed Commission Staff Working Document and on the website of the 
Competition Directorate-General1.  
                                                 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html  
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40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 
COMPETITION POLICY: AN ASSET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION  
Continuity and evolution in EU competition policy 
4. For 40 years the Commission has documented how it has enforced and shaped EU 
competition policy. To mark this anniversary this year's Report steps back from the 
pressing urgencies of today to take view of the evolutions of competition policy.  
5. The first Report on competition policy was published in 1971 in response to a 
request by the European Parliament. Not much later the European Economic 
Community faced a severe economic crisis brought about by the oil price shock of 
1973, resulting in inflationary pressures. The early Reports give an account of how 
competition policy was used by the Commission as part of a wider policy mix to 
address this economic crisis. The deployment of competition policy within a 
coordinated policy response to deal with major economic challenges is thus not 
unprecedented. 
6. Likewise, while the environment in which EU competition policy operates has 
undergone profound changes, such as rapid technological development, enlargement 
or globalisation, the original Treaty provisions of 1957 which prohibit certain 
anticompetitive agreements and abuses of dominant positions as well as the 
provisions on State aid have remained remarkably unchanged over time, a testament 
to their inherent ability to be applied in different circumstances. 
7. Council Regulations, which outline the Commission's specific enforcement powers 
and obligations in more detail, have also been marked by considerable continuity and 
resilience. In the antitrust area, the 1962 Council Regulation specifying the 
Commission's enforcement powers was not amended until 2004. In merger control, 
the corresponding Regulation was adopted in 1989 and was overhauled only once 
thereafter. A Regulation laying out detailed procedural rules in the State aid area was 
adopted in 1999.  
8. Given its exclusive powers in the area of competition policy, confirmed by the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Commission is empowered to adopt more detailed rules on how it 
intends to apply its main tools, i.e. the Treaty provisions on antitrust, mergers and 
State aid. This discretion in design and applying such rules has been several times 
confirmed by the judgments of the European Courts in Luxembourg, whose case law 
has played an essential role in ensuring the consistency and the efficiency of 
competition policy. 
1966 1971 1971
Consten and Grundig case GEMA decision Deutsche Grammophon case
The European Court establishes the principle 
that agreements prohibiting exports within the 
common market restrict competition.
First application of Article 82 EC (now 102 
TFEU) condemning the abuse of dominance of 
a German collecting society refusing the 
admission to nationals of other Member States.
The Court prohibits the holder of intellectual 
property rights to use them to prevent import 
of its own products, thus laying the basis for 
the principle of exhaustion of rights and 
confirming the importance of parallel trade.  
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9. This discretion has also facilitated the Commission in shaping and maintaining the 
regulatory framework up-to-date with the changing challenges in the making of the 
EU. Nevertheless, two clearly identifiable threads run through the entire history of 
EU competition policy: its contribution to the construction and preservation of the 
internal market and its contribution to consumer welfare. At the same time, 
competition policy has supported the main objectives of the Union as set out in the 
Treaties: a competitive market, economic, social and territorial cohesion and 
sustainable development. 
Contributing to the construction of the internal market 
10. A key priority in the first decades of existence of the European Economic 
Community was to progressively remove State-imposed barriers between the 
Member States. Competition rules of the EEC Treaty – in particular the antitrust 
rules – accompanied and supported this progressive dismantling of barriers to trade. 
Indeed, in the terms of the first Report on Competition Policy, "the Community's 
policy must, in the first place, prevent governmental restrictions and barriers – 
which have been abolished – from being replaced by similar measures of private 
nature"2. Accordingly, the antitrust rules were rigorously enforced to prevent 
companies from artificially dividing the internal market through practices such as 
market sharing and partitioning, price discrimination or raising obstacles to parallel 
trade. The first antitrust cases targeting impediments to parallel imports agreed 
between private firms date back to the 1960s, notably the pioneering decision in 
1964 against the Grundig-Consten agreement3 which led to a partitioning of the 
market and substantial price differences between France and Germany for the same 
products. Extensive enforcement activities in this area continued throughout the 
1970s and beyond, targeting anticompetitive practices such as market sharing 
cartels4. 
 
 
 
 
 
1973 1976 1980
Commission v Germany Suiker Unie case (Sugar cartel) Philip Morris
The Court establishes the Commission's 
right to request repayment of non-notified 
incompatible aid. 
Holding that it is not necessary to prove that there 
is an actual plan, the Court condemns various 
sugar producers who had taken part in concerted 
practices to protect the position of two Dutch 
producers on their domestic market. 
The company challenges the entire legal basis 
of State aid control after the Commission 
denied it investment aid. The Court confirms 
the Commission's general powers, discretion 
and many of its preferred modes of analysis.  
                                                 
2 Report on Competition Policy 1971, p. 13 
3 Cases C-56/64 and C-58/64 Grunding-Consten [1966] ECR 299 
4 Such as the Sugar cartel – see Suiker Unie and others v Commission, judgment of 16.12.1975 
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11. The introduction of merger control in 1989 – one of the towering milestones over the 
past 40 years – has to be seen in the light of the qualitative leap that the internal 
market was undergoing in the run-up to its formal creation on 31 December 1992 
after the entry into force in 1987 of the Single European Act. Competition policy 
took into account the new market realities of increased opportunities for European 
firms to merge and acquire assets across national borders. A step-change was 
required and the Merger Regulation of 1989 was the culmination of a campaign that 
the Commission had initiated already in 1973, establishing a one-stop-shop for 
review of mergers and acquisitions having a European dimension5. 
An increased focus on consumer welfare 
12. Subsequently, over the past two decades, the Commission's antitrust and merger 
policy and enforcement more effectively placed the emphasis on consumer welfare, 
notably through an increasingly refined economic analysis. The Commission's work 
on the Merger Regulation had led the way, eliminating risks of consumer harm 
resulting from the creation and strengthening of dominant positions through mergers.  
13. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Commission's antitrust policy began to take 
major strides towards an effects-based approach, notably through the adoption of the 
first generation of rules on agreements between competitors (horizontal agreements) 
and agreements between different levels in the distribution chain (vertical 
agreements). This new generation of antitrust rules made it possible for the 
Commission, when weighing the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of different 
agreements, to focus on those involving companies with market power, i.e. where 
consumer harm could potentially arise. 
14. This also allowed the Commission to better focus its limited resources on the most 
harmful agreements between firms, such as cartels which effectively have no pro-
competitive effects and are therefore in practice always prohibited. As in the case of 
other antitrust violations by firms, the Commission can impose fines aimed at 
deterring such conduct. While the fight against hard-core cartels is fully recognised 
today as a fundamental pillar of competition policy, this was not always so and the 
Commission had initially proceeded step by step in the absence, by and large, of 
national laws and enforcement against cartels. According to one account "[the] 
objective was, according to [the then Commissioner for Competition] to open an 
investigation into a few major cartels which were particularly damaging to the 
establishment of the Community"6. Yet again, the connection with the progressive 
establishment of the internal market is stated.  
1983 1985 1988
Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek case Block exemptions Renault decision
Annulling the Commission's decision on the 
ground of shortcomings in its analysis, the 
Court sets standards for the economic analysis 
required by the Commission to justify its State 
aid decisions.
In the 1980s, the Commission increasingly 
turns towards legislation for establishing 
competition law norms, from informal and 
general notices to formal and binding block 
exemptions.
After long negotiations, the Commission 
approves French State aid on certain 
conditions. This case is a symbol of the 
Commission's will to assert more effective 
control over State aid to industry.  
                                                 
5 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (OJ L 257, 21.9.1990, p. 13) 
6 The European Commission – History and Memories, p. 306 
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15. The year 2002 marked a watershed for competition policy, with the Court of First 
Instance annulling, in relatively swift succession, three Commission merger 
prohibition decisions on account of lack of sufficient economic analysis and errors of 
assessment. But it brought long-term benefits in that the Commission decided to 
rapidly upgrade its capability to undertake more sophisticated economic analysis, 
notably through the creation of a team of specialised economists under the 
responsibility of a Chief Economist as soon as 2003. 
16. This greater economic orientation was being taken further in the ensuing years, in 
particular with the adoption of a refined substantive test7 which firmly placed the 
cursor on whether the transaction was likely to lead to a significant impediment on 
effective competition, notably by taking full account of the potential static and 
dynamic efficiencies. This new test allowed extending the Commission's review 
beyond the question of whether the transaction would place a firm in a dominant 
position, to covering other situations of unilateral anti-competitive use of market 
power. In that same year, the Commission adopted horizontal merger guidelines 
providing a clear framework for the analysis of such unilateral effects8. 
17. With the adoption of guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities regarding 
exclusionary abuses of dominant undertakings9, the economic approach aimed at 
maximising consumer welfare has become embedded into the antitrust enforcement 
framework. The above-mentioned document recognises that dominant firms are 
entitled to compete vigorously on the merits, and that as a general principle the 
Commission will not focus on conduct that leads to inefficient or less efficient rivals 
having to leave the market, provided that this is the result of competition on the basis 
of merits, such as the quality of their products and services. 
 
 
 
 
 
1989 1991 1995-1998
Merger Regulation De Havilland decision Credit Lyonnais
The Merger Regulation provides that 
concentrations having a Community dimension 
are subject to Community jurisdiction and 
removed from the jurisdiction of the National 
Competition Authorities.
For the first time the Commission prohibits a 
merger, namely between a Canadian company 
and a French/ Italian consortium.
The Commission approves the high amount of 
State aid only on the condition that the French 
Government commits itself to privatise Crédit 
Lyonnais in an open, transparent and non-
discriminatory process.  
                                                 
7 Introduced in 2004 in Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1-22) 
8 Such as in cases Korsnas/Assidoman Cartonboard or T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring 
9 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7-20) 
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18. The broadened focus encompassing consumer welfare – ensuring that markets can 
deliver the best outcomes for consumers in terms of prices, output, innovation and 
quality and diversity of products and services – does not mean that the internal 
market is no longer relevant. On the contrary, in legal terms, the nexus between 
competition policy and internal market was confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Moreover, as the crisis has shown, the integrity of the internal market must never be 
taken for granted. The Commission must be prepared to use all its available tools 
whenever this core asset of the European Union comes under attack. EU competition 
policy – and in particular State aid rules – proved to be of crucial value in preserving 
the internal market, in particular by maintaining a level playing field in the financial 
and industrial markets. 
The evolution of State aid control from humble beginnings to its current status as a 
cornerstone of the internal market 
19. State aid control has become an essential pillar of the Single Market, ensuring that 
companies are able to compete on equal terms independently of where they are 
located and providing safeguards against Member States engaging in mutual subsidy 
races at the expense of each other and of the general European interest. Such subsidy 
races would not only lead to a wasteful use of scarce resources, they would be to the 
detriment of the cohesion of the EU. 
20. The EU's State aid regime – a historically unique experiment10 – had to be developed 
gradually from scratch; indeed, an early inquiry by the Commission faced with a 
"jungle formed by national schemes, many of which were long-standing, complex 
and constantly changing"11. As a matter of fact, it was not until 1973 that the Court 
of Justice recognised that the Commission could legally require Member States to 
order firms to pay back unlawfully granted State aid which was not compatible with 
the Treaty12. It took another ten years until the Commission decided to enforce this 
principle as a matter of policy. It is telling that the Report on competition policy 
1989 felt it had to state the obvious fact that "even if tolerated or accepted in the 
past, [State aid] compatibility with the common market must be re-examined"13.  
 
1996 1999 2001
Leniency Notice State aid procedural Regulation GE/Honeywell case
Companies which provide information on a 
cartel before the Commission has opened an 
investigation can benefit from partial or total 
immunity from fines. Experience shows that it 
has led to a substantial increase in the number 
of cartels that have been uncovered and 
punished.
The Council Regulation codifies the 
Commission's practice and the Court's 
jurisprudence, providing for the first time a 
clear and transparent set of procedural rules 
and clarifying the procedures to be respected 
by the Commission and Member States 
regarding the State aid process.
The merger is permitted in the US but 
prohibited by the Commission because of its 
effects on the EU market. However, it is one of 
the rare examples of disagreement between the 
EU and US competition authorities since the 
Commission decision in Boeing / McDonnell 
Douglas in 1997.  
                                                 
10 The foundations of the concept of State aid were laid out already in 1961 in the Case 30-59 De 
Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v Haute Autorité de la Communauté Européenne du 
Charbon et de l'Acier [1961] ECR 3 
11 The European Commission, 1958-1972 – History and memories, p. 312 
12 Case C-70/72 Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 813 
13 Report on Competition Policy 1989, p. 14 
 EN 8   EN 
21. Indeed, the number of staff dedicated to State aid control also remained 
comparatively low until the end of the 1990s. Even so, landmark decisions were 
adopted showing the determination of the Commission to tackle heavily subsidised 
inefficient State firms, first in large industrial sectors and then in the services sectors. 
For instance, important agreements were concluded between the Commission and 
Member States to put an end to historical unlimited guarantees to public firms14. 
Governance: embedding competition policy across the EU and projecting it beyond its 
borders  
22. As a competition culture evolved, with the internal market consolidating and the 
Commission and, increasingly, National Competition Authorities (NCAs) developing 
their competition policies, time was ripe for a radical overhaul of the governance of 
EU competition policy. This was the so-called Modernisation of EU antitrust rules15; 
in fact, the entry into force of antitrust Modernisation and the enlargement took 
effect on the very same day: 1 May 2004. 
23. In parallel, the Commission issued guidance to Member States on how it would 
assess support to specific policy objectives of common European interest, such as 
R&D, regional development, the environment or the restructuring of firms in 
difficulty. By 2005, State aid control was at the forefront of EU competition policy, 
illustrated by the status of the State Aid Action Plan as one of the two key priorities 
of EU competition policy for that mandate, alongside cartel enforcement. Among 
other things, the increased focus on State aid control has contributed to the evolution 
towards "less and better targeted aid", as highlighted by both the decreasing relative 
amount of aid granted by Member States (from 1.2% of EU GDP in 1992 to 0.62% 
in 2009, excluding crisis measures) and the increasing share of aid dedicated to 
objectives of common interest (from 50% in the mid-nineties to 84% in 2009)16. The 
State Aid Action Plan also advocated a more economic approach based on a so-
called "balancing test" of the possible negative and positive effects of the aid, to be 
used mainly for in-depth assessments of types of aids which are typically the most 
distortive.  
 
2001 2001-2003 2002-2003
Courage v Crehan
Mandate of Hearing Officer revised and 
Chief Economist position created
Airtours case; Schneider Electric case and 
Tetra Laval case
The Court rules that anyone who has suffered a 
harm caused by an infringement of the EC 
competition rules must be able to claim 
compensation.
These decisions aim at enhancing the 
objectivity and quality of the Commission's 
competition proceedings and the resulting 
decisions. 
In overturning three merger prohibition 
decisions, the Court requires the Commission 
to provide adequate reasoning in its decisions, 
based on accurate and persuasive evidence. 
 
                                                 
14 In particular the Andreatta / Van Miert agreement of July 1993 concerning certain public undertakings 
in Italy (see IP/93/734, 8.9.1993) and the Monti / Koch-Weser agreement of July 2001 on the German 
system of State guarantees for public law credit institutions (see IP/01/1007, 17.7.2001). 
15 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25) 
16 State Aid Scoreboard – Autumn 2010 Update (COM(2010) 701) 
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24. Under the Modernisation reforms, NCAs and national courts were empowered and 
obliged to apply all EU antitrust rules directly and in full to cases affecting trade 
between Member States, placing the NCAs on an equal footing as enforcers with the 
Commission as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and emphasizing 
the Courts' role in antitrust private enforcement, following the Courage v Crehan 
judgment17 highlighting the need for an effective system of antitrust damages actions 
as part of the overall enforcement architecture18. Underlying this regime change was 
a sense that the competition culture of the Member States after nearly fifty years of 
antitrust policy had reached a sufficiently advanced state to justify a significant 
degree of decentralisation in its enforcement. The impending enlargement, the largest 
in the EU's history, added urgency to the reform process.  
25. Modernisation has significantly contributed to a more level playing field for 
businesses operating across borders, allowing them to plan their business strategies 
according to one as opposed to 27 sets of rules19. The ECN has fostered close 
cooperation among NCAs and the Commission which resulted in an enhanced and 
more consistent enforcement of EU antitrust rules. In addition, by removing the 
obligation to notify agreements, the reform enabled both the Commission and NCAs 
to focus their enforcement activities on infringements which are the most harmful for 
European consumers. The Commission has also been pursuing increased 
convergence between EU level and national merger control, drawing on the 
experience of the antitrust Modernisation. 
26. The continuous integration of Member States' economies within a consistent 
competition framework has been mirrored by the advocacy efforts of the 
Commission to promote common competition principles internationally. In an ever 
more globalised economy, ensuring a more level playing field on the world stage has 
become an essential objective of competition policy. This led the Commission, 
starting from the 1990s "to seek to encourage the application of similar policies by 
the Community's main trading partners, by means of bilateral agreements or through 
multilateral negotiation"20. Consequently, the Commission pursued a twofold 
strategy: it developed and strengthened direct bilateral relations with main trading 
partners and it invested substantially in multilateral bodies such as the OECD or the 
International Competition Network (ICN). 
2003 2004 2004
Altmark Case
Council Regulation 1/2003 
("Modernisation Regulation") Microsoft case
The Court clarifies that public service 
obligations only escape State aid scrutiny if 
the undertaking entrusted with the public 
service is an efficient undertaking. This 
strengthens the Commission's powers of 
control of public service obligations.
The notification system for potentially 
anticompetitive agreements is replaced by a 
self-assessment system. A new framework 
for co-operation between the National 
Competition Authorities and the 
Commission is established.
Microsoft abused its market power by deliberately 
restricting interoperability between Windows PCs 
and non-Microsoft work group servers, and by tying 
its Windows Media Player with its dominant 
Windows operating system. By levying additional 
fines for non-cooperation, the Commission shows 
strong enforcement of its decisions.
 
                                                 
17 Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297 
18 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (COM(2008) 165 final) 
19 Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (COM(2009) 206 final) 
20 Report on Competition Policy 1992, p. 15 
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27. The first Cooperation Agreement with the US was signed already in 1991 and laid 
the basis for the very successful cooperation between the Commission and the US 
antitrust authorities. Similar agreements were concluded with Canada (1999), Japan 
(2003) and South Korea (2009) and have proven instrumental in addressing 
international antitrust cases. These bilateral efforts have been complemented at the 
multilateral level, in particular in the OECD and the ICN, to which the Commission 
has been actively involved as a founding member and which serve as important fora 
to spread best practices, to foster convergence and to facilitate cooperation. 
28. The importance of the international dimension is increasingly recognised, most 
recently in the Report from former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti on "A 
New Strategy for the Single Market"21. While this Report lists several key challenges 
relating directly to the internal market dimension of EU competition, such as 
deepening the coherence of the implementation of antitrust rules across Member 
States and the coordination between the Commission and NCAs, in particular in the 
assessment of mergers or in the fining policies, it also emphasises the need for 
greater convergence on competition policy principles at the international level, 
especially with the fastest growing EU trade partners. Indeed, the Commission has 
recently been deepening its bilateral cooperation with the competition agencies of 
major economic powers, such as China, India and Brazil. Developing an effective 
competition policy and competition culture is a major challenge which requires time, 
as shown by the EU's own experience. At the same time, competition agencies and 
competition legislation have become part of mainstream economic governance as 
illustrated by the exponential growth over the last decades in the number of 
competition agencies which form part of the ICN (currently exceeding 100 agencies). 
Competition policy as a tool to support competitiveness in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy  
29. It is clear from the early annual Reports that the contribution and support of 
competition towards other policy objectives has gone well beyond being used as a 
crisis resolution instrument. As the EU exits from the current crisis in the face of 
fierce global competition, a major challenge for competition policy in the coming 
years will be to support as effectively as possible the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, 
inclusive and sustainable growth.  
 
 
2009
Intel Case
Intel harmed millions of European consumers 
by deliberately acting to keep competitors out 
of the market for computer chips for many 
years, thus limiting consumer choice and 
artificially raising prices (case under appeal).
The Commission temporarily amends the rules for State aid to the financial sector and the real 
economy in order to allow for additional State support for financial institutions and to mitigate the 
effects of the crisis on the real economy. This highlights the flexibility of competition rules and 
their safeguarding role in coordinating Member States' actions and preserving the Single Market.
2008-2010
Temporary state aid measures
 
                                                 
21 Report by Professor M. Monti to the President of the European Commission: "A new Strategy for the 
Single Market" of 9.5.2010 
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30. Competition policy is well placed to make such a contribution as it is a key driver for 
making markets work better through an efficient allocation of resources and 
increased productivity and innovation. It therefore underpins the competitiveness of 
the EU economy, which is more important than ever to maintain economic and 
financial stability. Competition policy and competition-enhancing reforms must thus 
form an integral part of the economic governance.  
31. Competition rules also recognise the need to enable Member States to promote the 
Union's objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion. The regional aid 
guidelines facilitate the realisation of the territorial cohesion of the Union by 
promoting the development of poorer regions. The different State aid rules also allow 
for training aid and the promotion of the access of disadvantaged and disabled 
workers to employment.  
32. Another essential area where competition policy has evolved to take into account a 
long-term challenge to the Union is the protection of the environment and the 
promotion of sustainable growth. Through both its antitrust enforcement activities in 
the energy sector which enhances liquidity and security of supply in the internal 
market and its adoption of environmental State aid guidelines, which facilitate aid to 
address market failures in this area, the Commission has ensured that competition 
policy supports the shift towards a more sustainable economy.  
Conclusion: resilience and adaptability of EU competition policy 
33. The European Union is undergoing a period of rapid and dramatic changes. Some 
challenges and issues can be foreseen with some degree of certainty – the exit from 
the crisis, global competition and sustainable development are among the most 
prominent. But the EU will no doubt face other challenges which cannot be foreseen 
yet. Nevertheless, it is clear that competition policy throughout its existence has, 
against the background of a stable Treaty framework, been able to cope with the 
considerable evolutions of its environment. Given its resilience and adaptability, EU 
competition policy will continue to be one of the European Union's assets. 
1. INSTRUMENTS 
1.1. Follow-up to the implementation of the temporary crisis framework for State 
aid 
1.1.1. Crisis-related support for the financial sector 
34. Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008, the 
Commission provided detailed guidance on the criteria for the compatibility of 
temporary crisis-related support measures for financial institutions under Article 
107(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), whether 
in the form of State guarantees22, recapitalisations23 or asset relief measures24 and on 
                                                 
22 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8)  
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the necessary restructuring measures for distressed banks25. Through the application 
of State aid rules, the Commission ensured that distortions of competition within the 
internal market were limited to a minimum despite the important amounts of State 
aid and that beneficiary banks were restructured when necessary.  
35. Between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2010, the Commission took more than 200 
decisions on State aid measures for the financial sector aiming to remedy a serious 
disturbance in Member States' economies. More than 40 schemes were authorised, 
amended or prolonged and individual decisions concerned more than 40 financial 
institutions. In 2009, the nominal amount of aid to the financial sector used by 
Member States constituted EUR 1 107 billion (9.3% of EU GDP), whereas the figure 
for 2008 was EUR 1 236 billion26. 
36. The availability of State guarantees proved to be an effective tool throughout the 
crisis to improve access to funding for banks and to restore market confidence. The 
use of recapitalisation schemes was limited in 2010 while some ad hoc interventions 
took place during 2010. However, the situation showed a reduction in the use of 
State capital injections in 2010 compared to 2009; moreover, banks which benefited 
from asset relief or capitalisation support measures in 2009 or 2010 were subject to 
restructuring obligations. 
37. Restructuring of a number of European banks was among the main challenges of 
2010 and followed three main principles: (i) the return to long-term viability without 
State aid, based on a sound restructuring plan, (ii) burden sharing between the 
bank/its stakeholders and the State and (iii) limitation of competition distortions, 
usually through structural (divestitures) and behavioural measures (acquisition bans 
or limitations on aggressive commercial behaviour). In 2010, the Commission 
approved 14 banks' restructuring or liquidation. The main cases concerned Aegon, 
Dexia, Ethias, Parex and Sparkasse Köln/Bonn27; they were all approved by the 
Commission and included binding behavioural and structural measures. The 
Commission adopted a negative decision in the case of Banco Privado Português and 
the bank is currently in liquidation28. 
38. As a result of policy intervention, the severe shortage of bank funding that occurred 
in autumn 2008 was overcome relatively quickly. However, the sovereign crisis 
which struck in the first half of 2010 clearly showed that, although some 
improvement compared to the peak of late 2008, the level of stress in financial 
markets was still requiring targeted crisis-related support beyond 2010. On 
1 December 2010, the Commission extended the validity of the rules for crisis-
                                                                                                                                                        
23 Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation 
of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (OJ C 10, 
15.1.2009, p. 2) 
24 Communication on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector (OJ C 72 of 
26.3.2009, p. 1) 
25 Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial 
sector in the current crisis under the State aid rule (OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9) 
26 State aid scoreboard – Autumn 2010 Update (COM(2010) 701) 
27 Cases N372/2009 Viability plan for Aegon, C9/2009 Restructuring of Dexia, N256/2009 Restructuring 
aid for Ethias, C26/2009 Restructuring aid for Parex and C32/29 Restructuring of Sparkasse 
Köln/Bonn 
28 Case C33/2009 Restructuring of BPP 
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related measures for the financial sector until the end of 201129. However, given the 
evidence that banks were facing fewer difficulties in raising capital on the markets, 
the Commission introduced from 1 January 2011 a requirement to submit a 
restructuring plan for every beneficiary of a recapitalisation or an impaired asset 
measure, irrespective of whether the bank is considered to be fundamentally sound or 
distressed. 
1.1.2. Implementation of the Temporary Framework for the real economy 
39. In 2008, the Commission adopted the Temporary Framework (TF)30 aimed at 
facilitating companies' access to finance in the context of the crisis. Between its 
introduction and 1 October 2010, the Commission approved 73 schemes and four ad-
hoc aid measures. The volume of aid approved in 2009 was EUR 82.5 billion (0.7% 
of EU GDP).  
40. The main measures used were the compatible limited amount of aid, the subsidised 
guarantees and the subsidised loans. The relaxation of the conditions for exceptional 
acceptance of government export credit insurance within the Community contributed 
to sustain trade. The risk capital adaptation was also positively perceived as an 
important signal for private investors. The subsidised loans for the production of 
green products were used by a smaller number of Member States, being notified by 
five of them31.  
41. In view of the fragility of the recovery, the Commission considered premature to let 
the TF expire in its entirety at the end of 2010. A progressive phasing-out was 
considered the most suitable response to the current market situation. The 
Commission approved on 1 December 2010 a prolongation of the Temporary 
Framework32 until the end of 2011 with a focus on SMEs and a limited spectrum of 
measures. The measures that address outstanding market failures, in particular the 
remaining problems on access to finance for SMEs, were maintained, subject to 
tighter conditions to reflect the gradual transition into the normal State aid regime.  
1.1.3. Contribution of competition policy to the economic adjustment programmes of 
Greece and Ireland 
42. In 2010, Greece found itself in a weak fiscal position. To support the Greek 
government's efforts to get its economy back on track, the Commission, the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pledged on 
2 May 2010 a three-year economic adjustment programme33 financed by Euro Area 
Member States in bilateral loans totalling EUR 80 billion and supported by the IMF 
with a stand-by arrangement of about EUR 30 billion. The Greek authorities agreed 
to a multi-annual programme of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in order 
                                                 
29 Communication on the application, after 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support measures in 
favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (OJ C 329, 7.12.2010, p. 7) 
30 Temporary framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial and 
economic crisis (consolidated version) (OJ C 83, 7.4.2009, p. 1) 
31 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom 
32 Temporary Union framework for State aid measures to support access to finance in the current financial 
and economic crisis (OJ C 6, 11.1.2011, p. 5) 
33 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, European Economy, Occasional Papers 61, May 
2010 
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to put the Greek economy on a sustainable path, to restore confidence on sovereign 
debt markets and to preserve the stability of the Euro area. In order to strengthen the 
Greek financial system, issuance of additional government guarantees was authorised 
by the Commission34, an independent Financial Stability Fund providing capital 
support to banks was established35 and restructuring plans for six of the recapitalised 
banks were submitted in line with EU State aid rules. Moreover, the structural 
reforms of the economic adjustment programme included a competition related 
section. Greece thus cooperated with the Commission on its new investment law, on 
reforms of the Hellenic Competition Authority and on the liberalisation of closed 
professions. 
43. As regards Ireland, the situation became very stressed for both the banks and the 
sovereign debt in the last quarter of the year. The combination of a severe economic 
crisis and of an oversized banking sector taking huge losses led to great pressure on 
the Irish sovereign debt. On 28 November 2010, a Programme was agreed between 
the Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), the IMF and the Irish 
authorities36. The Programme foresees a loan of EUR 85 billion to Ireland, of which 
EUR 35 billion will be available to restore banks' viability. As part of the 
Programme, two domestic banks will be wound down (Anglo Irish Bank & INBS), 
while others will be capitalised and restructured in compliance with EU State aid 
rules. As regards competition-related structural reforms, a number of policy 
measures will be taken to bolster competition in product and energy markets and 
other network industries. This includes introducing legislative changes to remove 
restrictions to trade and competition in sheltered sectors, addressing the current 
exclusion of certain sectors from the scope of the national competition law and 
improving deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour. 
1.2. Antitrust enforcement 
1.2.1. Shaping the rules: Review of Block Exemption Regulations 
 Block Exemption Regulation on vertical agreements 
44. On 20 April 2010, the Commission adopted a revised Block Exemption Regulation37 
and guidelines38 regarding vertical agreements, i.e. agreements between suppliers 
and buyers operating at different levels of the production and distribution chain for 
the supply and distribution of products and services.  
45. The basic principle of the revised rules remains that companies with limited market 
power are free to decide how their products are distributed, provided their 
agreements do not contain price-fixing or other hardcore restrictions. However, the 
rules were revised in order to take into account both the buyers' and sellers' potential 
                                                 
34 Case N260/2010 Third prolongation of Greek bank support scheme (OJ C 238, 3.9.2010, p. 3) 
35 Case N328/2010 Recapitalisation of credit institutions in Greece under the Financial Stability Fund 
(OJ C 316, 20.11.2010, p. 7) 
36 MEMO/10/624 
37 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices (OJ L 102, 23.4.2010, p. 1-7) 
38 Commission notice – Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (OJ C 130, 19.5.2010, p. 1-46) 
 EN 15   EN 
market power so that all parties to the agreement must have a market share under 
30% for a block exemption. 
46. The Regulation and accompanying guidelines also take into account the rapid 
development of the internet as a force for online sales and for cross-border 
commerce, which increases consumer choice and price competition. Through the 
added clarity and greater predictability of the new rules, distributors have clear 
incentives to develop online activities to reach and be reached by customers 
throughout the EU, thus ensuring the full realisation of the digital internal market. 
 Block Exemption Regulations on horizontal cooperation agreements 
47. On 14 December 2010, the Commission adopted new rules and guidelines for the 
assessment of horizontal cooperation agreements, i.e. agreements concluded between 
companies operating at the same level of the supply chain, such as agreements to 
cooperate on research and development, production, purchasing, commercialisation, 
standardisation, and exchange of information. This new regime consists of two Block 
Exemption Regulations regarding research and development agreements on one hand 
and specialisation and joint production agreements on the other hand39 and 
accompanying horizontal guidelines40. 
48. The Commission's approach enshrined in the new rules is to leave companies 
maximum freedom to cooperate while at the same time protecting competition from 
such cooperations which are contrary to Article 101 TFEU, e.g. by being harmful to 
consumers. The Commission's view on cooperation between competitors has not 
fundamentally changed since the previous rules were put in place in 2000. 
Nevertheless, the new rules on horizontal cooperation agreements are much more 
detailed, user-friendly and clearer than the previous ones. Two key features of the 
reform include the insertion of a new chapter on information exchange and a 
substantial revision of the chapter on standardisation agreements. The latter in 
particular clarifies the key conditions to ensure competitive standard-setting 
processes and contributes to the objective of building a more efficient standards 
system for Europe as set out in the Flagship Initiative "An Integrated Industrial 
Policy for the Globalisation Era" of the Europe 2020 strategy41. 
Sectoral Block Exemption Regulations 
49. In the field of insurance, the new Insurance Block Exemption Regulation42 was 
adopted on 24 March 2010. On 27 May, the Commission adopted new competition 
                                                 
39 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union to categories of research and development 
agreements (OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 36) and Commission Regulation (EU) No 1218/2010 of 
14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation 
agreements (OJ L 335, 18.12.2010, p. 43) 
40 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to horizontal cooperation agreements (OJ C 11, 14.1.2011, p. 1) 
41 An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era: Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at 
Centre State (COM(2010) 614) 
42 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector 
(OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 1) 
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rules for agreements between vehicle manufacturers and their authorised dealers, 
repairers and spare parts distributors43. The new rules broadly align competition 
policy in the car market to the general regime applicable to other sectors. 
1.2.2. Private enforcement of EU antitrust rules 
50. Private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules is an essential complement to a strong 
public enforcement by the Commission and National Competition Authorities. In its 
2008 White Paper on antitrust damages actions44, the Commission suggested a 
number of measures, such as collective redress and quantification of antitrust 
damages, to improve the possibilities for consumers and businesses to obtain 
compensation for harm caused to them by antitrust infringements.  
51. The Commission's suggestions on collective redress triggered a broad public debate 
that goes beyond the boundaries of the antitrust field and focuses on the role of 
collective redress where a single infringement of EU rules harms large groups of 
victims. The Commission decided to prepare a public consultation which should 
contribute to identify a set of common principles for any future legislative proposals 
concerning collective redress. A Communication presenting such principles has been 
scheduled for adoption in 2011. 
1.2.3. Applying Article 101 TFEU: Cartels 
52. In 2010 the Commission adopted seven cartel decisions45 imposing fines totalling 
over EUR 3 billion on 70 undertakings, maintaining its strong enforcement focus on 
the fight against cartels.  
53. The Commission focused on making the process more efficient through the 
application of the settlement procedure. In 2010, the Commission adopted its two 
first settlement decisions: a full settlement decision in the DRAMs case and a hybrid 
settlement decision in the Animal Feed Phosphates case. The DRAMs case 
constituted a milestone in EU cartel practice since its settlement comprised all ten 
undertakings involved and its decision was not appealed.  
54. Against the background of the economic crisis, the seven cartel decisions adopted in 
2010 led to 32 applications for a fine reduction on grounds of "inability to pay"46, 
nine of which were granted after a thorough analysis of the financial situations of the 
applicants. 
                                                 
43 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices in the motor vehicle sector (OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52) 
44 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (COM(2008) 165 final) 
45 Cases COMP/38511 DRAMs, COMP/39092 Bathroom fittings & fixtures, COMP/38344 Pre-stressing 
steel, COMP/38866 Animal Feed Phosphates, COMP/36212 Carbonless paper (re-adoption for 
Bolloré), COMP/39258 Airfreight and COMP/39309 LCD 
46 See Point 35 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 (OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, p. 2-5) 
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1.2.4. Applying Article 101 TFEU: Other agreements and concerted practices 
55. In 2010, the Commission put an end to a major antitrust case under Article 101 
TFEU in the air transport sector by making legally binding commitments offered by 
British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia47. This decision will entail significant 
benefits for European consumers by ensuring that sufficient competition on the 
transatlantic flights, in particular from London, is maintained. 
56. In the financial services sector, the Commission made binding Visa's commitments 
on Multilateral Interchange Fees for immediate debit card transactions applicable to 
cross-border transactions in the EEA and to domestic transactions in nine EEA 
countries48, bringing them in line with the MasterCard's unilateral undertakings of 
1 April 200949 and the "merchant-indifference methodology" to modes of payment.  
57. The Commission also adopted its first antitrust decision in the health services market. 
It imposed a fine of EUR 5 million on the French Association of Pharmacists50 
condemning its market behaviour in the French market for clinical laboratory testing.  
1.2.5. Applying Article 102 TFEU: abuse of dominant position 
58. The Commission continued its enforcement activities of Article 102 TFEU, notably 
in the energy sector, where it took four decisions and in the ICT sector, where it 
opened several proceedings.  
59. In the energy sector, the Commission followed upon its 2007 energy sector inquiry, 
adopting four major antitrust decisions, whereby commitments proposed by 
undertakings to put an end to a potential infringement were made binding. They 
relate to incumbents in France, Sweden, Germany and Italy foreclosing access to 
energy markets through various means, such as long-term supply contracts with 
resale restrictions or limiting available transport or export capacities on energy 
networks51. 
60. In the ICT markets, the Commission opened proceedings against IBM concerning 
potential abuses of a dominant position in the mainframe computer market, and 
against Google Inc on potential abuses of a dominant position in online search, 
online advertising and online advertising intermediation. The Commission launched 
two preliminary investigations into Apple's business practices relating to the iPhone. 
Both were closed after Apple proposed to change these practices52. 
                                                 
47 Case COMP/39596 BA/AA/IB. See IP/10/936 and MEMO/10/330, 14.7.2010. 
48 Case COMP/39398 Visa MIF. See IP/10/1684, 8.12.2010. 
49 Case COMP/34579 MasterCard. See IP/09/515, 1.4.2009. 
50 Case COMP/39510 ONP. See IP/10/1683, 8.12.2010. 
51 See section 2.2. infra. 
52 See section 2.4. infra. 
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Number of antitrust and cartels enforcement decisions per year and type, 2005-2010 
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1.3. Merger control 
61. In 2010 the number of mergers notified was at low level due to the economic crisis. 
In total, 274 transactions were notified to the Commission, 16 decisions were 
submitted to conditions and no prohibition was decided this year. The large majority 
of the mergers notified were approved without conditions both under the normal 
procedure and the simplified procedure, which represented 55% of notifications. 
62. The Commission took three decisions in 2010 following an in-depth analysis in 
second phase investigation for the Oracle / Sun Microsystems53 (see section 2.4. 
infra), Monsanto / Syngenta54 and Unilever / Sara Lee Body55 mergers.  
63. On 17 November 2010, after an in-depth investigation, the Commission cleared the 
acquisition of the global sunflower seed business of the US company Monsanto by 
Syngenta of Switzerland conditional upon the divestment of Monsanto's sunflower 
hybrids, commercialised or under official trial in Spain and Hungary, as well as the 
parental lines used in the creation of those hybrids or currently under development 
for the creation of hybrids for Spain and Hungary. 
64. The Commission also cleared on the same date the planned acquisition by the Anglo-
Dutch consumer goods company Unilever of the body and laundry care businesses of 
Sara Lee Corp of the US, subject to conditions. The Commission's in-depth 
investigation had shown that the merger would give Unilever a very strong 
leadership position in a number of deodorants markets by combining the parties' 
                                                 
53 Case COMP/M.5529 Oracle / Sun Microsystems (OJ C 91, 9.4.2010, p. 7)  
54 Case COMP/M.5675 Syngenta / Monsanto's sunflower seed business. See IP/10/1515, 17.11.2010. 
55 Case COMP/M.5658 Unilever / Sara Lee Bodycare. See IP/10/1514, 17.11.2010. 
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brands, most notably Sanex with Dove and with Rexona which presently compete 
against each other. To remedy these concerns, the merging parties offered to divest 
Sara Lee's Sanex brand and related business in Europe. 
Number of merger final decisions per year and type, 2005-2010 
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1.4. State aid control 
65. The majority of aid approved in 2010 related to horizontal objectives of European 
common interest, such as culture and heritage conservation, regional cohesion, 
environment protection, research, development and innovation and compensations of 
damages caused by natural disaster, notwithstanding aid related to the economic and 
financial crisis. Member States made wide use of the possibilities offered by the 
General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)56, whereby measures which fulfil its 
criteria may be granted without prior notification to the Commission. In 2010, the 
Commission was informed about the introduction of 414 such new measures by 
Member States.  
66. In terms of amount of aid authorised, figures are compiled with one year delay in the 
bi-yearly State aid Scoreboards. Total aid excluding crisis-related measures 
amounted in 2009 to 0.62% of GDP or EUR 73.2 billion, at a slightly higher level 
than 2008 (0.58% of GDP). On average, 84% of aid to industry and services was 
directed towards horizontal objectives of common interest57. 
                                                 
56 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the common market in application of Article 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General Block 
Exemption Regulation) (OJ L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3) 
57 State aid scoreboard – Autumn 2010 Update (COM(2010) 701) 
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67. 2010 was the first full year with the Simplification Package in place. This Package 
comprises a Best Practice Code58 and a Notice on a Simplified Procedure59, both of 
which aim at improving the effectiveness, transparency and predictability of State aid 
procedures. The first results of the Best Practices Code were encouraging, in 
particular regarding complaints-handling, with an increasing number of complainants 
informed of the status of their complaints. 
Evolution of total State aid granted by Member States as % of GDP in the EU, 2004-200960 
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1.4.1. Horizontal State aid 
 Regional aid 
68. In accordance with the guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-201361, the 
Commission carried out the review of the State aid status and the aid ceiling of the 
statistical effect regions that benefited transitionally from a status as an assisted area 
pursuant to Article 107(3)(a) until the end of 2010. Similarly, the Commission 
accepted changes to national regional State aid maps notified by three Member States 
                                                 
58 Code of Best Practice for the conduct of State aid control procedures (OJ C 136, 16.6.2009, p. 13-20) 
59 Notice from the Commission on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain types of State aid 
(OJ C 136, 16.6.2009, p. 3-12) 
60 The total covers aid to manufacturing, services, coal, agriculture, fisheries and part of the transport 
sector but excludes, due to the lack of comparable data, aid to the railway sector and aid for 
compensation for services of general economic interest. Aid amounts refer to the aid element (or gross 
grant equivalent in case of guarantees or loans) contained in a State aid measure as opposed to figures in 
point 35 mentioning amounts of aid used by Member States. See the State aid scoreboard – Autumn 
2010 Update (COM(2010) 701) for more on evolution of total State aid granted by Member States. 
61 Guidelines on national regional aid 2007-2013 (OJ C 54, 4.3.2006, p. 13-44) 
 EN 21   EN 
(France, Ireland and Italy) for certain areas eligible to regional aid on the basis of 
Article 107(3)(c). 
69. The Commission approved in 2010 regional aid to six large investment projects. Four 
of these projects are in the photovoltaic sector, three in Germany and one in Spain62, 
while the other investment projects are in the mechanics industry in Germany and in 
Italy63. Furthermore, five ad hoc aid measures in favour of single enterprises for 
investments in areas under the Regional Aid maps 2007-2013 were approved, as well 
as ten regional aid schemes, five of which regarding outermost regions. The 
Commission closed in 2010 three formal investigations with one positive64 and two 
negative decisions concerning an illegitimate SME bonus in favour of Sovello AG65, 
and an incompatible aid measure in favour of Fri-el Acerra66 because of the absence 
of incentive effect and insufficient regional contribution. 
Environmental aid 
70. The Commission cleared a number of measures in support of energy saving and 
renewable energy production under the environmental aid guidelines67. An 
increasing number of these notifications concerned relatively large individual aid 
(above EUR 7.5 million investment aid per undertaking) and were subject to a 
detailed economic assessment as part of the more economic approach to State aid 
analysis. The approved schemes concerned mostly aid to renewable energy and to 
carbon capture and storage projects. 
 Research & Development & Innovation 
71. Innovation has been placed at the heart of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Flagship 
Initiative on an Innovation Union68 outlines the necessity to improve the financing of 
innovation in Europe to boost its performance. The Community Framework for 
research and development and innovation69 supports this objective by making it 
easier for Member States to better target State aid to the relevant market failures. In 
2010, the Commission approved twelve aid schemes, with an overall budget of more 
than EUR 5 billion, on the basis of this Framework, and decided to initiate a formal 
investigation procedure regarding one further case which was subsequently 
withdrawn. Out of those measures, five were pure R&D schemes, four were 
innovation-oriented schemes and four were mixed. In addition, following an in-depth 
economic assessment, the Commission decided not to raise objections to ten 
individually notifiable aids to large R&D projects referring to new processes for bio-
methane production, use of composite materials for the construction of specific 
components of aero-structures, and lithography for semiconductor devices. 
                                                 
62 Cases N641/2009 Solibro GmbH, N221/2009 Wacker Chemie AG, N237/2010 Sovello3 and N285/2009 
Silicio Solar 
63 Cases N261/2009 Liebherr MCCtec Rostock GmbH and N27/2010 Fiat Powertrain Technologies in 
Verrone 
64 Case C34/2008 Deutsche Solar AG 
65 Case C27/2008 Sovello AG (formerly EverQ) SME bonus (OJ L 167, 1.7.2010, p. 21-38) 
66 Case C8/2009 Fri-el Acerra s.r.l 
67 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, p. 1) 
68 See the Communication on an "Innovation Union" (COM(2010) 546 final).  
69 Community framework for State aid for research and development and innovation (OJ C 323, 
30.12.2006, p. 1-26) 
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Furthermore, it monitored information submitted on aids to 52 other R&D projects 
which exceeded EUR 3 million although without falling under the duty for individual 
notification. 
72. Moreover, 40 schemes providing aid for fundamental research, 91 for industrial 
research and 86 for experimental development were submitted under the GBER. The 
GBER was also used by Member States for measures relating to innovation, 42 of 
which related to industrial property rights for SMEs, 21 to young innovative 
enterprises, 24 to innovation advisory and support services, and eleven to the loan of 
highly qualified personnel. 
Aid to promote risk capital 
73. In the area of risk capital financing for SMEs, the Commission approved seven 
measures under the risk capital guidelines70 with an overall budget of EUR 
380 million. Out of those measures, three did not comply with the safe harbour 
provisions and were subject to a detailed assessment. Furthermore, eleven additional 
aid schemes were implemented in 2010 under the GBER, which some Member 
States increasingly used for risk capital purposes. 
1.4.2. Aid to coal and agricultural sectors 
74. Following a proposition from the Commission in July 2010, the Council adopted a 
decision on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines71 on 
10 December 2010 in light of the expiry of the current Regulation at the end of 
201072. Member States will be able to grant aid to support coal production if there is 
a closure plan whose deadline does not extend beyond 31 December 2018 and to 
cover exceptional costs (social welfare, rehabilitation of sites or removal of waste 
water) associated with the closure of mines until 2027.  
75. The Commission assesses State aid granted to the agriculture and to the forestry 
sector on the basis of the guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 
2007 to 201373. In 2010, 214 new State aid cases were registered and 161 decisions 
were adopted. 
1.4.3. State aid enforcement by national courts 
76. According to a recent study74, more and more cases are brought before national 
courts. In 2010, the Commission continued its efforts to improve the system of 
private State aid enforcement at national level focusing on enhancing communication 
with national judges. In October 2010, it published a handbook on the "Enforcement 
                                                 
70 Community guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (OJ C 194, 18.8.2006, p. 2) 
71 Council decision of 10 December 2010 on State aid to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive coal mines 
(OJ L 336, 21.12.2010, p. 24-29) 
72 Council Regulation (EC) No 1407/2002 of 23 July 2002 on State aid to the coal industry (OJ L 205, 
2.8.2002, p. 1-8) 
73 Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007-2013 (OJ C 319, 
27.12.2006, p. 1) 
74 2009 Study on the enforcement of State aid law at national level available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/enforcement_study_2009.pdf 
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of EU State aid law by national courts"75 in order to assist national judges in dealing 
with State aid cases.  
1.4.4. Ex-post monitoring of State aid measures 
77. To ensure effective enforcement of the State aid rules, the Commission has launched 
regular ex-post monitoring exercises since 2006 for non-notified aid measures 
granted under the GBER or under approved schemes. In 2010, ex-post monitoring 
included measures covered by the GBER, as well as aid in the form of risk capital, 
aid in the transport sector, aid in the broadband area, cultural aid and aid to the 
shipbuilding sector. The results of the first exercises show that schemes and BERs 
function in a satisfactory manner. In a minority of cases substantive problems or 
procedural issues were identified. 
1.4.5. Recovery policy 
78. When unlawful aid is declared incompatible, the Commission is entitled to ask for its 
recovery by the Member State who granted it in order to restore the previous market 
situation. The amount of illegal and incompatible aid recovered has increased from 
EUR 2.3 billion in December 2004 to EUR 10.9 billion in December 201076. The 
percentage of illegal and incompatible aid still to be recovered has declined 
accordingly from 75% to 14%. 
79. In order to ensure better enforcement of its decisions, the Commission brought 
proceedings in 2010 under Article 108(2)77 in three cases and under Article 260(2)78 
in one case, thus leading to 26 cases under litigation. As of end 2010, the 
Commission had 41 pending active recovery cases. 
2. SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS 
2.1. Financial services 
80. The financial and economic crisis continued into 2010 to hit the EU financial sector. 
The temporary regulatory framework established in 2008 was further extended to 
2011 under tightened conditions. Its implementation was the main focus of 
competition enforcement over the year, in particular in the field of restructuring of 
supported financial institutions79. 
81. However, the Commission maintained its vigilance over the other competition policy 
challenges affecting the sector. The Commission made legally binding the 
commitments offered by Visa Europe in April 2010 concerning its Multilateral 
Interchange Fee (MIF) for immediate debit cards transactions applicable to cross-
                                                 
75 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/state_aid/national_courts_booklet_en.pdf  
76 These figures do not include State aid granted to the agricultural, fishery and transport sectors. 
77 Actions under Article 108(2) are aimed at condemning a Member State for non-implementation of a 
State aid recovery decision. 
78 Actions under Article 260(2) are infringement actions aimed at condemning a Member State for non-
implementation of a Court judgment, and may include the payment of fines. 
79 See section 1.1. infra. 
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border transactions in the EEA and to domestic transactions in nine EEA countries80 
and a number of transparency measures81. Visa Europe's maximum weighted average 
MIF for those transactions will be reduced to 0.2%, in line with the unilateral 
undertakings previously offered by MasterCard82. The commitments were assessed 
under the "merchant-indifference methodology" which seeks to set MIFs at a level at 
which merchants are indifferent as to whether a payment is made by immediate debit 
card or by cash. The Commission concluded that the MIF rate proposed by Visa 
Europe should be made binding and closed the proceedings as regards the specific 
MIFs covered by the commitments, while the rest of the case (including MIFs for 
credit cards) is still ongoing. 
82. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) continued to be an important focus of 
antitrust advocacy in the field of financial services in 2010, in particular through 
informal dialogue with the European Payments Council. For instance it was clarified 
that SEPA compliant card schemes do not need to cover all 32 States of the SEPA 
territory, giving new schemes a real chance of entering the market. In addition, the 
Commission adopted a proposal on establishing technical requirements for credit 
transfers and direct debits in Euros83 on 16 December 2010. It includes provisions to 
forbid per transaction MIFs for SEPA Direct Debit after a transitional period but to 
allow MIFs for reject transactions under certain conditions. 
83. On 15 September 2010, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation on 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories 
which include several measures aiming at making OTC derivatives markets safer and 
at enhancing financial supervision84. It foresees a common framework for central 
counterparties (CCPs) in the EU and lays down the conditions for the establishment 
of interoperability arrangements between CCPs for cash securities. Interoperability 
arrangements should be welcomed from a competition perspective as they give 
customers a choice and allow CCPs to consolidate clearing volume at a single entity.  
84. Following a two and a half years review involving all interested market players and 
National Competition Authorities, the Commission adopted on 24 March 2010 the 
new insurance Block Exemption Regulation85 (BER) on agreements in relation to 
joint compilations, tables and studies and the common coverage of certain types of 
risks (pools) in the insurance sector. In the new BER, the Commission decided not to 
renew two of the four types of cooperation covered under the previous one, namely 
agreements concerning standard policy conditions and security devices, which are 
now addressed by the new Horizontal guidelines adopted in 2010. 
                                                 
80 In EEA countries where the domestic MIF rates apply in the absence of other MIFs or are set directly 
by Visa Europe. 
81 Case COMP/39398 Visa MIF. See IP/10/1684, 8.12.2010. 
82 Case COMP/34579 MasterCard. See IP/09/515, 1.4.2009. 
83 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing technical 
requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in Euros and amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 
(COM(2010) 775 final, 2010/373 COD) 
84 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories (COM(2010) 484/5, 2010/0250 COD) 
85 Commission Regulation (EU) No 267/2010 of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices in the insurance sector (OJ L 83, 30.3.2010, p. 1-7) 
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85. The reduced merger activity persisted in 2010 in the financial sector. The 
Commission examined cases in the sectors of retail banking services86, asset 
management87 and distribution of mutual funds services88. A number of cases 
resulted from restructuring State aid decisions in the context of the financial crisis89.  
2.2. Energy and environment 
86. The Commission presented in November 2010 its energy strategy for the next ten 
years in the framework of the Flagship Initiative of the Europe 2020 strategy on a 
"Resource Efficient Europe"90. An open and competitive single market in the energy 
sector should contribute to a secure and sustainable supply of energy at competitive 
prices by encouraging the rapid development of renewable energies and by 
promoting the development of new environmentally friendly technologies.  
87. In 2010, the Commission continued to follow up on its 2007 energy sector inquiry, 
adopting four major antitrust decisions whereby the Commission made binding the 
commitments proposed by undertakings to put an end to an infringement. These 
commitments are expected to have a major structural impact on competition in the 
energy internal market. 
88. In the EDF Customer Foreclosure case91, the Commission had concerns that EDF 
may have abused its dominant position in France by concluding supply contracts 
which foreclosed the market given their scope, duration and exclusive nature and by 
including resale restrictions in its supply contracts. EDF offered, for a period of ten 
years, to ensure that other suppliers could compete for 65% on average of the 
electricity EDF contracts with large French industrial users each year and to limit the 
duration of any new contract concluded with large industrial users to five years. In 
addition, EDF committed to remove all resale restrictions in its supply contracts and 
to assist customers wishing to resell electricity. These commitments, planned to 
come into effect on 1 July 2010, were postponed to 1 January 2011. 
89. In the Svenska Kraftnät (SvK) case92, the Commission had concerns that SvK may 
have abused its dominant position in the Swedish electricity transmission market by 
limiting the export capacity available on interconnectors in order to relieve internal 
congestion on its network and to reserve domestic electricity for domestic 
consumption. SvK offered to operate the Swedish electricity market on the basis of 
several flexible bidding zones from 1 November 2011 on. This will allow electricity 
trading to adjust to available transmission capacity through market prices rather than 
through arbitrary measures. 
                                                 
86 Cases COMP/M.5948 Santander / Rainbow and COMP/M.5960 Crédit Agricole / Cassa di Risparmio 
della Spezia / Agences Intesa Sanpaolo 
87 Case COMP/M.5580 Blackrock / Barclays Global Investors UK Holdings 
88 Cases COMP/M.5728 Credit Agricole / Société Générale Asset Management and COMP/M.5726 
Deutsche Bank / Sal. Oppenheim 
89 Cases COMP/M.5948 Santander / Rainbow and COMP/M.5968 Advent / Bain capital / RBS Worldpay 
90 See the Commission's Communications on "A resource-efficient Europe" (COM(2011) 21 final) and on 
"Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy" (COM(2010) 639 final). 
91 Case COMP/39386 Long term electricity contracts in France (OJ C 133, 22.5.2010, p. 5-6) 
92 Case COMP/39351 Swedish Interconnectors (OJ C 142, 1.6.2010, p. 28-29) 
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90. In E.ON Gas93, the Commission's investigation showed that E.ON had reserved, on a 
long-term basis, the largest part of the available transport capacity at the entry points 
to its gas transmission networks, thereby potentially preventing other gas suppliers 
from accessing the German gas market. The Commission reached the preliminary 
view that the long-term reservations might have infringed EU rules on the abuse of a 
dominant market position. E.ON undertook to release about 15% of pipeline capacity 
at the entry points to its gas networks by October 2010. From October 2015, E.ON 
will further reduce its bookings of entry capacity in the NetConnect Germany grid to 
50% and in E.ON's grid for low-calorific gas to 64% of the pipeline capacity.  
91. In the ENI case94, the Commission had concerns that ENI may have abused its 
dominant position in the gas transport markets by refusing to grant competitors 
access to capacity available on the transport network, by granting access in an 
impractical manner and by strategically limiting investment in ENI's international 
transmission pipeline system. ENI may also have had the incentive to foreclose rivals 
to protect its margins in the downstream gas supply markets. ENI committed to the 
structural divestment of its international transport activities for the import of gas into 
Italy from Russia and from Northern Europe.  
92. In the context of the open investigations, the Commission is still examining aid 
granted in the form of regulated electricity tariffs in France and Spain. Regulated 
tariffs may result in undue price advantages for electricity end-users and create 
market foreclosure. In the majority of Member States, regulated tariffs in favour of 
medium and large undertakings have been abolished or are being phased-out. France 
will phase-out regulated tariffs for medium and large undertakings in 2015, in the 
framework of a reform of the electricity market (loi Nome) which is set to be 
implemented as of 2011. Spain abolished such tariffs in 2009.  
93. The Commission cleared a number of measures in support of energy saving, 
renewable energy production and remediation of contaminated sites under the 
horizontal environmental aid guidelines95. In particular, the Commission authorised 
investment aid for the implementation of an innovative production process to one 
German steel producer and investment aid to another German steel producer for the 
implementation of a process recycling the gas emitted in the steelmaking process96. 
The Commission cleared investment aid for the construction of a biomass boiler in 
France97and for the construction of a high-efficiency combined heat and power plant 
in Austria98. The Commission also authorised aid to remediate two contaminated 
sites in Austria99. 
94. The Commission dealt with two individual support measures for industrial-scale 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) demonstration projects. The Commission 
                                                 
93 Case COMP/39317 E.On Gas Foreclosure. See IP/10/494, 4.5.2010. 
94 Case COMP/39315 ENI. See IP/10/1197, 29.9.2010. 
95 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, p.1) 
96 Case N450/2009 Top Gas Recycling (TGR) Project - Aid to Arcelor Mittal Eisenhüttenstadt GmbH 
(OJ C 94, 14.4.2010, p. 9) 
97 Case N650/2009 Aid for the realisation of a biomass (wood) fueled thermo boiler 
98 Case N295/2008 Investment aid to Mellach power plant (OJ C 154, 12.6.2010, p. 1) 
99 Cases N135/2000 Aid for the Remediation of a Contaminated Site in Linz (OJ C 312, 17.11.2010, p. 5-
6) and N197/2010 Individual Aid for the Remediation of the Contaminated Site in Unterkärnten 
(OJ C 265, 30.9.2010, p. 1) 
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authorised investment aid for a CCS demonstration project in Rotterdam where the 
CO2 from power generation is captured and stored in a depleted gas field100. The 
Commission also approved investment aid to a Dutch power generator for a project 
in which the CCS technology is tested on a coal gasification process101. 
95. In the area of security of electricity supply, the Commission approved aid for the 
construction of a 400 MW thermal power plant in Latvia102 on the basis of a number 
of special factors including the isolation of the Latvian energy market, Latvia's 
increasing dependence on gas and the closure of the Lithuanian Ignalina nuclear 
power plant at the end of 2009. The Commission also authorised a Dutch scheme 
using tax deductions to encourage investment in the exploration and exploitation of 
small gas fields on the Dutch continental shelf in the North Sea103. It authorised a 
Spanish aid scheme intended to compensate electricity generators for using 
indigenous coal for some of their production as a public service obligation104. While 
the Electricity Market Directive105 allows Member States to take such measures for 
security of supply reasons, they are subject to State aid rules, in particular the 
Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation106. 
The Commission found no manifest error of assessment in the justifications made by 
Spain as regards the definition of the public service obligation and verified that all 
the requirements of the framework were satisfied. Furthermore, the scheme being of 
a transitional nature, Spain undertook not to extend it beyond 2014; it also committed 
to ensure its consistency with current and future EU rules on State aid to the coal 
industry. 
2.3. Electronic Communications 
96. As a part of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the Commission launched on 26 August 2010 
its Digital Agenda for Europe107. It sets out the Commission's priorities in the field of 
the digital economy, among which the creation of a single market for telecom 
services. In particular, it puts forward the Commission objective to bring to near zero 
the difference between roaming and national tariffs by 2015. It also sets ambitious 
target for fast and ultra-fast internet access in Europe. 
97. In 2010, more effective competition due to competition law enforcement, sector 
regulation, technological developments and new business models resulted in lower 
prices for electronic communication services and innovative service offers. A 
Commission report released in June 2010108 showed that EU telecom markets are 
becoming more competitive thanks to the Commission's guidance in the consultation 
                                                 
100 Case N381/2010 CCS project in Rotterdam harbour area 
101 Case N190/2009 CO2 Catch-up pilot project at Nuon Buggenum plant (OJ C 238, 3.9.2010, p. 1) 
102 Case N675/2009 Tender for Aid for New Electricity Generation Capacity (OJ C 213, 6.8.2010, p. 1) 
103 Case N718/2009 Development of marginal offshore gas fields (OJ C 270, 6.10.2010, p. 1) 
104 Case N178/2010 Preferential dispatch of indigenous coal plants (OJ C 312, 17.11.2010, p. 6) 
105 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJ L 176, 
15.7.2003, p. 37)  
106 Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (OJ C 297, 29.11.2005, 
p. 4)  
107 A Digital Agenda for Europe (COM(2010) 245 final/2) 
108 Market Reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework – Further steps towards the consolidation of the 
internal market for electronic communications (COM(2010) 271 final) 
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and review process under the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications. 
98. In the Telekomunikacja Polska case109, the Commission sent on 1 March 2010 a 
Statement of Objections to the Polish incumbent operator, preliminary concluding 
that it had infringed Article 102 by abusing its dominant position in refusing to 
supply remunerated access to its wholesale broadband services. 
99. The merger of France Télécom's and Deutsche Telekom's UK subsidiaries110, cleared 
on 1 March 2010, highlighted the importance of spectrum ownership in the 
development of 4G networks. The investigation showed that the parties' combined 
contiguous spectrum could result in the new entity being the only mobile network 
operator in the UK able to offer next-generation mobile data services through Long 
Term Evolution technology at the best possible speeds in the medium term. The 
clearance decision was thus conditional upon, inter alia, divestiture of a quarter of 
the parties' combined spectrum in the 1800 MHz band. 
100. In order to achieve its objectives of reaching fast broadband coverage for all 
European citizens and ultra-fast broadband subscriptions for at least 50% of 
European households by 2020, the Commission assessed and approved the use of 
State aid and other types of public funding under the broadband guidelines111 for 
approximately EUR 1.8 billion that generated total investments in broadband 
networks of more than EUR 3.5 billion.  
2.4. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
101. Efficient ICT products and services are essential to the smart growth put forward as a 
major objective of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Preserving opportunities for new firms 
to enter the market and challenge established players is essential to realise the full 
potential of the digital economy. Competition can be fostered by interoperability and 
efficient standards since they typically favour entry by a greater number of players 
and drive down the costs of innovation. 
102. Against this background, the Commission sought to provide more guidance on 
standardisation agreements in its guidelines on cooperation agreements adopted on 
14 December 2010. For the positive effects of standardisation to fully materialise, the 
standard-setting process should be transparent and accessible to all interested market 
players. In addition, holders of intellectual property rights are encouraged to commit 
to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND commitment) 
and effectively adhere thereto to ensure accessibility of the standard.  
103. In spring 2010, the Commission launched two parallel preliminary investigations into 
business practices by Apple relating to the iPhone112. Apple had made warranty 
repairs service available only in the country where the iPhone was bought, which 
could have potentially led to a partitioning of the EEA market. Apple had also 
                                                 
109 Case COMP/39525 Telekomunikacja Polska. See IP/10/213, 1.3.2010. 
110 Case COMP/M.5650 T-Mobile / Orange (OJ C 108, 28.4.2010, p. 4) 
111 Community guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of 
broadband networks (OJ C 235, 30.9.2009, p. 7-25) 
112 See IP/10/1175, 25.9.2010. 
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restricted the terms and conditions of its licence agreement with independent 
developers of applications requiring the use of Apple's native programming tools and 
approved software languages to the detriment of third-party software. This could 
have ultimately resulted in shutting out competition from applications developed for 
running on other mobile platforms. Since Apple decided in September 2010 to 
introduce cross-border iPhone warranty repair services within the EEA and to relax 
the restrictions on the development tools for iPhone apps, the Commission decided to 
close both investigations. 
104. On 26 July 2010, the Commission initiated formal antitrust investigations against 
IBM Corporation based on two different alleged infringements of EU antitrust rules 
related to the abuse of a dominant position in the market for mainframe computers113. 
The investigation focuses on IBM's alleged tying of mainframe hardware to its 
mainframe operating system and on IBM's alleged exclusionary practices towards 
competing suppliers of mainframe maintenance services.  
105. On 30 November 2010, the Commission initiated formal proceedings against 
Google114 with a view to further investigating allegations that Google has abused a 
dominant market position in online search, online advertising and online advertising 
intermediation, following complaints from several search service providers. 
106. Microsoft sent to the Commission the first two reports on the implementation of the 
Choice Screen software which Microsoft agreed to distribute to users of Windows 
within the EEA in order to offer an unbiased choice between the most widely used 
web browsers115. By the end of November 2010, the Choice Screen had been seen 
more than 270 million times, and more than 84 million web browsers had been 
downloaded through it. 
107. On 21 January 2010, the Commission cleared the planned acquisition of Sun 
Microsystems by Oracle Corporation, the leading proprietary database software 
vendor116. The acquisition raised the issue of the competitive effect of open source 
software products, such as Sun's database MySQL. Following a second phase 
investigation, the Commission approved the acquisition unconditionally.  
108. The Commission conditionally approved the acquisition of Tandberg by Cisco117 
since the investigation revealed concerns regarding the market for high-end 
videoconference products due to interoperability issues. Conditions included the 
divestment of the Telepresence Interoperability Protocol developed by Cisco to an 
independent industry body to ensure interoperability and allow other vendors to 
participate in its development.  
                                                 
113 Cases COMP/39511 IBM Corporation, COMP/39790 TurboHercules/IBM and COMP/39692 IBM 
Maintenance Services. See IP/10/1006, 26.7.2010. 
114 Cases COMP/39740 Foundem/Google, COMP/39775 Ejustice/Google and COMP/39768 Ciao/Google. 
See IP/10/1624, 30.11.2010. 
115 Case COMP/39530 Microsoft (tying) (OJ C 36, 13.2.2010, p. 7). 
116 Case COMP/M.5529 Oracle / Sun Microsystems (OJ C 91, 9.4.2010, p. 7) 
117 Case COMP/M.5669 Cisco / Tandberg. See IP/10/377, 29.3.2010. 
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2.5. Media 
109. In the context of the transition to digital broadcasting, the Commission sent in 
November 2010 a letter of formal notice to the French authorities regarding the 2007 
French law granting existing analogue TV broadcasters the possibility to obtain an 
additional national TV channel in the digital switchover. In the absence of 
convincing evidence that such TV broadcasters obtained the additional channels 
based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria, the 
Commission considered that it appeared to be in breach of EU law118.  
110. In September 2010, under the ongoing infringement procedure concerning the Italian 
broadcasting legislation, the Italian Authority for Communications adopted criteria 
and rules aimed at ensuring that more frequencies resulting from the "digital 
dividend" are assigned to newcomers and smaller existing companies. The tender for 
such frequencies should be launched in 2011.  
111. In December 2010, the Commission cleared the acquisition by News Corporation of 
the UK pay-TV operator British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB)119. The Commission 
concluded that the transaction would not lead to a significant impediment to effective 
competition, without prejudice to the investigation by the competent UK authorities 
of whether it is compatible with the UK interest in media plurality. 
112. The Commission continued to approve State financing for public service 
broadcasters where both the public service remit and the financing are determined in 
full transparency and where the State funding does not exceed what is necessary to 
fulfil the public service mission. On 20 July 2010, the Commission closed with a 
positive decision the formal investigations into the new financing system for public 
service broadcasters in France and Spain in view of the phasing out of advertising by 
those chains120 and closed the investigation into the existing financing regime for the 
Dutch public service broadcasters, following amendments and formal commitments 
by the Netherlands121. 
2.6. Pharmaceutical industry 
113. Following the conclusion of the inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector in 2009122, the 
Commission announced the revision of the so-called "Transparency Directive" 
setting minimum rules for pricing and reimbursement procedures123. The review will 
examine ways to improve the transparency of such measures and to avoid related 
market access delays, in particular for generic medicines. A number of Member 
States (e.g. Spain, Italy or Austria) also took up recommendations from the sector 
inquiry on improving market access for generic medicines. 
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119 Case COMP/M.5932 News Corp / BSkyB. See IP/10/1767, 21.12.2010. 
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122 Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 8.7.2009  
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114. The sector inquiry also contributed to the momentum towards the adoption of the 
Community patent and the specialised patent litigation system in Europe as 
advocated and proposed by the Commission. On 10 December 2010, the Council 
indicated that an enhanced cooperation is the only option for moving ahead on the 
creation of a unified EU patent system. The Commission submitted such a proposal 
on 14 December 2010124. 
115. The Commission also started to monitor patent settlements in the EU125. The 
proportion of patent settlements in the pharmaceutical sector that are potentially 
problematic fell to 10% in the period July 2008 to December 2009 compared with 
22% in the period covered by the sector inquiry (January 2000-June 2008). The 
simultaneous increase in the overall number of patent settlements increased showed 
that companies are not prevented from concluding settlements by the Commission's 
ongoing enforcement action. 
116. Different enforcement actions are under way as a direct follow-up to the sector 
inquiry. The Commission is investigating patent settlement agreements concluded by 
Servier and a number of generic operators for the hypertension drug perindopril126. 
On similar issues, the Commission also opened formal proceeding against the Danish 
pharmaceutical undertaking Lundbeck relating to its antidepressant drug 
citalopram127.  
117. The pharmaceutical sector also became a priority for a number of National 
Competition Authorities (NCA). For instance, in the UK, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) issued a Statement of Objections to Reckitt Benckiser in February 2010 which 
admitted the infringement and agreed to pay a fine of GBP 10.2 million128. The 
Italian NCA opened a formal investigation against the originator company Pfizer 
over a potential abuse of the patent system by artificially prolonging patent 
protection for the drug latanoprost. 
118. The consolidation trend in the pharmaceutical sector continued in both the originator 
and the generic segments of the market. The main cases that were examined were 
Abbott / Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Teva / Ratiopharm and Novartis / Alcon129. These 
cases were cleared in the first phase with commitments. Given that pharmaceutical 
companies are often active worldwide, the procedures involved cooperation with 
other competition authorities around the world.  
2.7. Healthcare services 
119. The Commission adopted its first antitrust decision in the health services market 
imposing a fine of EUR 5 million on the French Association of Pharmacists 
(ONP)130. The Commission condemned the market behaviour of ONP in the French 
                                                 
124 Proposal for a Council decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection (COM(2010) 790 final, 2010/0384 NLE) 
125 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry  
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market for clinical laboratory testing. In particular, it established that ONP limited 
possible price reductions for clinical testing and restricted the development of certain 
groups of laboratories with a view to protecting the economic interests of the 
majority of its members. 
120. During 2010, the Commission examined a number of complaints lodged by private 
health service providers against their allegedly unfair treatment or against potential 
excessive compensation of publicly-owned hospitals. These complaints usually came 
from operators in Member States with health care markets more open to competition 
(e.g. Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands).  
2.8. Transport 
121. The economic downturn of 2009 had a significant impact on almost all transport 
sectors but 2010 proved to be a year of progressive recovery. By the end of 2010, 
prices in air and maritime transport had largely come back to pre-crisis levels. 
2.8.1. Air transport 
122. On 14 July 2010, the Commission put an end to a major antitrust case under Article 
101 in the air transport sector by making legally binding commitments offered by 
British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia131 in response to the competition 
concerns stemming from their agreement to coordinate prices, capacity, schedules, 
marketing and sales and to share revenues on transatlantic routes. To address the 
identified competition concerns, the three airline companies committed to release 
seven slot pairs at London Heathrow or London Gatwick airports on four routes, to 
offer fare combinability and special pro-rate agreements and to provide competitors 
access to the parties' frequent flyer programmes. This decision will entail significant 
benefits for European consumers by ensuring that sufficient competition on the 
transatlantic flights, in particular from London, is maintained. 
123. In 2010, air transport concentrations constituted an important focal point in merger 
control, reflecting the ongoing industry consolidation. On 14 July 2010, the 
Commission cleared the merger between British Airways and Iberia following a 
market investigation which showed that the merged entity will continue to face 
sufficient competition in passenger and air cargo transport as well as ground 
handling132. On 27 July 2010, the Commission approved the merger of United 
Airlines and Continental Airlines which are both US carriers providing scheduled air 
passenger and cargo transport between the EEA and the US133. The market 
investigation confirmed the complementary nature of their transatlantic networks. On 
30 July 2010, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation of the planned 
merger between Olympic Air and Aegean Airlines following initial indications that 
the proposed concentration would lead to very high market shares on a number of 
routes134. 
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124. The Eyjafjallajökull volcano eruption in Iceland in April 2010 created a cloud of 
volcanic ash which covered most of Europe, except the Mediterranean region 
airspace. On 4 May 2010, the Council agreed to "recall the existing legal framework 
applicable to potential support measures by Member States" (Article 107(2)(b) 
TFEU) in its conclusions on the EU response to the consequences of the volcanic ash 
cloud on air transport. However, no Member State expressed in 2010 its intention to 
grant State aid to the air transport industry in the above mentioned context. 
125. Several State aids for investments in airport infrastructure were approved as 
compatible with the internal market for airports in the UK (Derry Airport), in Finland 
(Vaasa airport and Oulu airport) and in Latvia (Riga Airport)135. The Commission 
also closed the formal investigation procedure into the agreement concluded until 
2016 between Bratislava Airport and Ryanair by concluding that no advantage was 
being granted to Ryanair136.  
126. Besides, the Commission opened formal investigation procedures in February 2010 
on the State aid aspects of a loan granted to ČSA-Czech Airlines by a State-owned 
entity (Osinek) as well as a subsequent liberation of the collaterals of the loan137 and 
into several measures granted by the Hungarian authorities to support Malév, the 
national air carrier, in the context of its privatisation and subsequent re-
nationalisation138 in December 2010. Finally, the Commission authorised in 
November 2010 a rescue aid in the form of a loan facility worth EUR 52 million for 
the Maltese flag carrier139 to tackle liquidity problems faced by Air Malta until a 
sound restructuring plan is submitted to the Commission. 
2.8.2. Rail and inland transport 
127. The Commission adopted a proposal to recast the first railway package on 
17 September 2010140. The proposal aims at increasing competition on rail market by 
improving access to rail-related services such as terminals and maintenance facilities 
and by strengthening the powers of the national rail regulators. 
128. In the field of State aid control, the Commission adopted in February 2010 its first 
decision applying the new regulation on public passenger transport services which 
entered into force on 3 December 2009141. The Commission thus concluded the 
formal investigation procedure initiated in 2008 regarding the public-service 
contracts of the Danish railway company Danske Statsbaner (DSB)142. It found that 
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the compensation paid by the Danish government every year to DSB for the costs 
incurred in meeting its public-service obligations was limited to what was strictly 
necessary to cover those costs. The Commission authorised on 26 May 2010 the plan 
of Société nationale des chemins de fer belges (SNCB) to restructure its freight 
activities143 and authorised in December 2010 a rescue aid of around EUR 
128 million for BDZ EAD, the State-owned Bulgarian railway operating on both 
freight and passenger railway markets144. 
129. In the field of merger control, several acquisitions were approved by the Commission 
conditional to the divestment of activities in certain geographic markets, such as the 
proposed acquisition of rail and bus operator Arriva plc of the UK by Deutsche 
Bahn145 or to commitments to ensure an effective access for new entrants, such as the 
"New Eurostar" joint venture between the SNCF and London Continental 
Railways146. 
2.8.3. Maritime transport 
130. The Commission continued in 2010 to pursue advocacy efforts vis-à-vis third 
countries in the area of maritime antitrust. Its consistent message is to advocate the 
exemption from antitrust rules of certain consortia – an operational cooperation 
between liner shipping carriers for joint service of cargo carriage – whilst prohibiting 
all forms of price-fixing and capacity-fixing agreements. 
131. In January 2010 the Commission initiated proceedings against the "Baltic Max 
Feeder" scheme whereby owners of container vessels intended to jointly cover the 
costs of removing vessels from service147. The planned scheme was subsequently 
abandoned and the case closed. 
132. Also in January the Commission approved for the first time aid for launching a 
"Motorways of the Sea" project on the basis of both the maritime guidelines and the 
complementary aid guidelines148. The project concerns the establishment of a 
maritime link between the French port of Nantes-Saint Nazaire and the Spanish port 
of Gijón149 and aims at capturing between 3% and 5% of the road traffic currently 
passing through the west of the Pyrenees. 
133. As regards State aid to finance port infrastructure, the Commission decided to launch 
a study to collect information to better understand the functioning of ports and the 
public financing of their infrastructure. On the basis of its results, the Commission 
will be able to define a reliable approach for moving forward in that field.  
                                                 
143 Case N726/2009 Aide à la restructuration des activités "fret" de la SA de droit public SNCB. See 
IP/10/615, 26.5.2010. 
144 Case N402/2010 Rescue aid for the Bulgarian State Railways EAD (BDZ). See IP/10/1733. 
145 Case COMP/M.5855 Deutsche Bahn / Arriva plc (OJ C 276, 13.10.2010, p. 1) 
146 Case COMP/M.5655 SNCF / LCR / Eurostar (OJ C 272, 8.10.2010, p. 2) 
147 Case COMP/39699 Baltic Max Feeder. See IP/10/374, 26.3.2010. 
148 Guidance on State aid complementary to Community funding for the launching of the motorways of the 
sea (OJ C 317, 12.12.2008, p. 10) 
149 Cases N573/2009 and N647/2009 Aide à la mise en œuvre et à l'exploitation de l'autoroute de la mer 
entre le port de Nantes-Saint-Nazaire (France) et le port de Gijon (Espagne) opérée par GLD 
Atlantique (OJ C 74, 24.3.2010, p. 5) 
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2.9. Postal services 
134. Under the third Postal Directive150, most Member States will have to accomplish full 
market opening by eliminating any remaining reserved area by 31 December 2010, 
with a two years extension allowed for eleven Member States151. The liberalisation 
process is progressing swiftly and certain Member States (Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) already fully opened 
their postal markets ahead of the deadline. Despite the progress to date, genuine 
competition, notably in the letter mail segment, is only just beginning to emerge. It is 
essential to ensure that the possible compensation received by the universal service 
provider for the delivery of public service is consistent with the actual costs of the 
services and does not constitute an unfair advantage in order to ensure a level playing 
field between competitors and to promote competition in the postal services.  
135. In this context, the Commission continued in 2010 its investigation opened in 2007 
into the alleged overcompensation of Deutsche Post AG152 for carrying out its 
universal service obligations from 1989 to 2007. Following the confirmation of the 
annulment of the 2002 Commission decision by the Court of Justice153, the ongoing 
investigation follows, as demanded by the Court of Justice, a comprehensive 
approach including all universal services provided by Deutsche Post.  
136. In 2010, the Commission continued its formal investigation procedure opened in 
2009 in order to examine whether certain measures in favour of the Belgian postal 
operator De Post - La Poste are in line with EU State aid rules154. The Commission's 
current investigation, opened on 13 July 2009, is proceeding swiftly with active 
cooperation from the Belgian authorities and concerns a number of measures, 
including the compensation granted by Belgium for public service tasks, capital 
injections, relief of pension liabilities, transfer of buildings and tax exemptions. 
137. With its final decision of 26 January 2010155, the Commission closed the formal 
investigation procedure in which it had examined an alleged State aid granted in 
favour of French La Poste in the form of an unlimited State guarantee resulting from 
its public-law status. The Commission did not challenge the public service mission of 
La Poste nor its public ownership and control in light of the neutrality of European 
rules regarding property regimes applicable in Member States. However, it 
considered that the State guarantee resulting from the special status of La Poste 
represented incompatible State aid and should be removed, which was achieved 
through the conversion of La Poste into a public limited company on 1 March 
2010156. 
                                                 
150 Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 amending 
Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal 
services (OJ L 52, 27.2.2008, p. 3)  
151 Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania 
and Slovakia 
152 Case C36/2007 Complaint against the German State for unlawful State aid to Deutsche Post (OJ C 245, 
19.10.2007 p. 21) 
153 Case C-399/08 P European Commission v Deutsche Post AG 
154 Case C20/2009 (ex N763/2002) Mesures en faveur de La Poste (OJ C 176, 29.7.2009, p. 17) 
155 Case C56/2007 Garantie d'Etat illimitée - La Poste (France) (OJ L 274, 19.10.2010, p. 1) 
156 Loi No 2010-123 du 9 février 2010 relative à l'entreprise publique La Poste et aux activités postales 
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2.10. Automotive industry 
138. In 2010, the motor vehicle sector began to emerge from the crisis that hit it 
particularly hard in 2008 and 2009. In addition to sustaining this recovery, future 
challenges for the industry include the launch of more resource-efficient cars and the 
tailoring of distribution networks to demand levels and growing international 
competition. Potential competition issues include managing the necessary 
restructuring of the sector and fostering the development of "greener" cars while 
maintaining a level playing field. 
139. On 27 May 2010, the Commission adopted new competition rules for agreements 
between vehicle manufacturers and their authorised dealers, repairers and spare parts 
distributors. The new framework applies the general Vertical Block Exemption 
Regulation adopted on 20 April 2010 to such agreements from 2010 as regards the 
aftermarkets, and 2013 as regards the markets for the sale of new vehicles. In 
addition, the Commission adopted Regulation 461/2010157, which sets out three 
supplementary hardcore clauses relating to spare parts distribution, and a detailed set 
of supplementary guidelines for assessing vertical agreements in the sector158. The 
new rules represent a flexible and proportionate response to the differing intensities 
of competition on the primary and aftermarkets, and broadly align the rules 
applicable to agreements between car manufacturers and their authorised dealers, 
repairers and spare part distributors with the general regime. 
140. In 2010, 15 mergers in the automotive industry were notified to the Commission and 
all were cleared in the first phase without commitments. The acquisition of Volvo 
Cars by the Chinese companies Geely and Daqing159 was the only case involving car 
manufacturers. 
141. The automotive sector had the possibility to make use of the exceptional support 
measures contained in the State aid Temporary Framework as long as the approved 
schemes were not restricted to this activity but open to all the sectors of the 
economy. In particular, the Commission authorised in February 2010 the plans 
notified by Sweden to provide a guarantee that would enable Saab Automobile AB160 
to access a loan from the European Investment Bank (EIB) for an investment project 
worth EUR 1 billion related inter alia to fuel efficiency and car safety. On 
16 December, the Commission authorised a comparable guarantee by Sweden to 
enable Volvo Cars Corporation to access a EUR 500 million loan from the EIB to 
finance research and engineering activities related to fuel efficiency and road 
safety161. 
                                                 
157 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices in the motor vehicle sector (OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52-57) 
158 Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles 
and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles (OJ C 138, 28.5.2010, p. 16) 
159 Case COMP/M.5789 Geely / Daqing / Volvo Cars (OJ C 187, 10.7.2010, p. 3) 
160 Case N541/2009 State guarantee in favour of SAAB 
161 Case N520/2010 State guarantees in favour of Volvo Personvagnar AB (Volvo Cars Corporation)  
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2.11. Food supply chain 
142. In July 2010, the Commission set up the High Level Forum for a Better Functioning 
Food Supply Chain162. The Forum will in particular tackle unfair trading practices 
resulting from contractual imbalances and differences in bargaining power between 
suppliers and buyers. These practices, which must be distinguished from 
anticompetitive practices, normally fall under national contract or commercial laws. 
143. Several potential competition challenges are nonetheless affecting the food supply 
chain in Europe. The ECN Food Subgroup continued to serve as an operational 
framework for discussion and coordination among National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs) on these issues. A significant number of NCAs have actively undertaken 
inquiries in the food and retail sectors.  
144. Special attention was devoted to the dairy sector in light of the difficulties faced by 
dairy farmers during the recent milk crisis. Following the High-Level Group on Milk 
recommendations, the Commission adopted a legislative proposal163 in December 
2010 on contractual relationships in the milk sector. The proposal allows collective 
bargaining negotiations by producer organisations of milk farmers subject to certain 
limits based on their share of EU-wide and national milk production volumes. The 
proposal also provides for a "safety clause" allowing the competent NCA or the 
Commission to decide that the negotiations by a producer organisation may not take 
place where they would limit competition severely or where they would inflict a 
serious prejudice to dairy processors, in particular SMEs. 
3. THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK AND COOPERATION WITH NATIONAL 
COURTS 
145. In 2010, the European Competition Network (ECN) continued to be a very active 
forum for discussion and exchange of good practices on the enforcement of EU 
antitrust rules across the 27 Member States. The Commission was informed under 
Article 11(3) of Regulation 1/2003164 of 158 new case investigations launched by 
National Competition Authorities (NCA) in 2010, inter alia in the transport, energy, 
manufacturing, media and telecom sectors. Moreover, the number of enforcement 
decisions reported by NCAs and reviewed by the Commission increased by 36% 
compared to 2009. As in previous years, the Commission did not initiate in 2010 any 
proceedings with the view to ensuring coherency in decision-making. 
146. The Commission responded to two requests from national courts (Spain and 
Belgium) under Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 which allows national judges to 
ask the Commission for information in its possession or for an opinion on questions 
concerning the application of the EU competition rules. 
                                                 
162 Commission decision of 30.7.2010 (OJ C 210, 3.8.2010, p. 4), see also A better functioning food supply 
chain in Europe (COM(2009) 591 final). 
163 Proposal of 9 December 2010 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards contractual relations in the milk and milk 
products sector (COM(2010) 728) 
164 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25) 
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147. The Commission submitted written observations in three cases under Article 15(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003. The observations were submitted to the High Court of Ireland 
regarding conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU with a particular focus on capacity-
reducing restructuring agreements, to the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic in 
relation to the application of the economic continuity of undertakings and the 
effectiveness of fines and to the Dutch Supreme Court regarding the non-tax 
deductibility of fines. 
148. The Working Groups on horizontal agreements and on vertical restraints were 
particularly active this year in the context of the review of the corresponding Block 
Exemption Regulations and accompanying guidelines. A Merger Working Group 
was also established. 
149. In 2010, the ECN launched a publication for the attention of the legal and business 
communities as well as of consumer organisations and academics, the ECN Brief, 
aiming at increasing public awareness of the activities conducted by the ECN. 
4. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
150. The Commission continued to play a leading role in the International Competition 
Network (ICN), notably through its involvement in the Steering Group's "Second 
Decade Project" reflecting on the ICN future in the globalised economy. The 
Commission contributed to the work of the OECD Competition Committee and 
participated in the three sessions held in 2010. It also took part in the Sixth Review 
Conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
151. As in previous years, cooperation with US authorities was intensive and the 
Commissioner for Competition regularly met his US counterparts, Chairman Jon 
Leibowitz of the FTC and Christine Varney, the Assistant Attorney General. A 
number of important antitrust and merger cases investigated in 2010 affected both 
the EU and US markets. EU-US Best Practices on cooperation in reviewing mergers 
proved to be a useful framework for example in the Cisco / Tandberg and Novartis / 
Alcon cases. 
152. In December 2010, the Council gave a mandate to the Commission to negotiate an 
agreement on cooperation in competition matters with the Swiss Confederation. This 
agreement should be based on the agreements concluded so far with the United 
States, Canada, Japan and Korea and could in addition include provisions on the 
exchange of confidential information. 
153. Cooperation with China remained a priority in 2010. In addition to regular 
discussions concerning the anti-monopoly law and its implementing legislation, 
issues relating to concrete cases were discussed during high-level visits in Beijing 
and Brussels respectively. 
154. Close technical cooperation between DG Competition and the Competition 
Commission of India continued in 2010, in particular in the fields of restrictive 
agreements, abuse of dominance and merger control. 
155. DG Competition played an active role in the ongoing negotiations on Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) and other bilateral agreements with a large number of individual 
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third countries or third country groupings. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Council 
authorised on 16 September 2010 the signature of the EU-Korea FTA which is the 
first to contain a prohibition on certain types of subsidies. The EU also concluded 
negotiations for FTAs containing a competition chapter with the Andean Countries 
(Columbia and Peru) as well as with Central America. 
156. Significant progress was made by both Croatia and Turkey in fulfilling opening 
benchmarks of the competition chapter for EU admission requirements. In June, the 
Council decided to open the accession negotiations on the competition chapter with 
Croatia while the Turkish Parliament adopted a State aid law in October 2010. 
5. DIALOGUE WITH CONSUMER ORGANISATIONS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
157. The European Consumer Consultative Group (ECCG) subgroup on competition, 
consisting of one representative of national consumer organisations for each Member 
State and one representative from the European consumer association (BEUC) was 
consulted in 2010 on important issues such as vertical restrains and remedies and 
issued an opinion on actions for damages165, endorsed by the plenary ECCG. 
158. A consumer corner on DG Competition's website was further developed and made 
available in every official language since mid-2010. The website presents in a simple 
language the role of competition policy and the main competition cases. 
159. DG Competition published the results of the first comprehensive survey of 
stakeholders about their views on the perceived quality of DG Competition's 
actions166. The survey was carried out in two parts by two independent market 
research organisations among professional stakeholders and citizens in all EU 
Member States167. The study highlighted significant praise for the effectiveness of 
DG Competition's work and the integrity of its staff. The survey also provided 
several areas of constructive criticism, together with suggestions for improvement. 
6. INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION 
160. Following the European Parliament elections in 2009, and the start of the new 
Commission mandate in 2010, the new Framework Agreement between the two 
institutions was adopted in October 2010168. 
161. In 2010, the Parliament adopted Resolutions on the Report on Competition Policy 
2008, on the Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation, on Horizontal Agreements 
and on the Council decision on State aid for the closure of uncompetitive coal mines. 
In addition to the regular dialogue between the Commissioner and the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) in June and November, Vice-President 
Almunia announced the prolongation of the temporary State aid rules adopted in 
                                                 
165 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/empowerment/eccg_en.htm  
166 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/surveys_en.html  
167 Flash Eurobarometer Survey "EU citizens' perceptions about competition policy" by Gallup Hungary 
and Eurobarometer Qualititive Study "DG Competition stakeholder Study" by TNS qual+ 
168 Framework Agreement of 20 October 2010 on relations between the European Parliament and the 
Commission 
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response to the financial and economic crisis to Members of the ECON committee in 
October.  
162. The Commission cooperated closely with the Council by informing it of important 
policy initiatives in the field of competition, in particular on the temporary State aid 
measures in the context of the financial and economic crisis. The Council decision on 
State aid for the closure of uncompetitive coal mines was also an important file.  
163. After having been informed by the Commission, the European Economic and Social 
Committee adopted opinions on the Report on Competition Policy 2008, on 
uncompetitive coal mines, on shipbuilding, and on the Motor Vehicle BER, thus 
contributing to the policy debates in the field of competition policy. 
